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MINIMAL NON-RELEVANT LOGICS
WITHOUT THE K AXIOM II.
NEGATION INTRODUCED AS A PRIMITIVE
UNARY CONNECTIVE
A b s t r a c t. In the first part of this paper (RML No. 42) a spec-
trum of constructive logics without the K axiom is defined. Nega-
tion is introduced with a propositional falsity constant. The aim
of this second part is to build up logics definitionally equivalent to
those displayed in the first part, negation being now introduced
as a primitive unary connective. Relational ternary semantics is
provided for all logics defined in the paper.
.1 Introduction
This paper is a sequel to [6]. Let us expose its results briefly. As is well
known, B+ is Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic in the ternary rela-
tional semantics with a set of designated points (see, e.g., [7]). Now, BK+
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is the result of adding the K rule
(a). ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ B → A
to B+. The logic BK+ is the basic positive logic in the ternary relational
semantics without a set of designated points (see [6]). In [6] a series of
logics extending BK+ and included in “intuitionistic” modal logic S4 are
defined. It is proved that all the logics in this series lack the K axiom
(b). A → (B → A)
Negation is introduced in these logics with a propositional falsity con-
stant F . Firstly, the logic BKm is defined. It is the result of introduc-
ing a minimal negation in BK+. Secondly, the logic BKcdn is axiomatized
by adding to BKm the weak contraposition and double negation axioms.
Thirdly, the logic BKcdnr is the result of adding to BKcdn the reductio ax-
ioms. Finally, the logic BKj is axiomatized by adding the EFQ (“E falso
quodlibet”) axioms to BKcdnr.
In [6], it is shown how to strengthen these logics with some strong pos-
itive axioms. Ternary relational semantics are defined for these extensions.
The aim of this paper is to provide logics definitionally equivalent to
BKcdn, BKcdnr and BKj in which negation is introduced as a primitive unary
connective ¬ (negation). Let us briefly explain the importance of these
results. Let S+ be a positive logic, SF , the result of introducing a negation
via a falsity constant F and S¬, the result of introducing a negation with a
negation connective. If S+ is a relatively strong logic, it is not difficult to
find a logic S¬′ definitionally equivalent to SF and a logic SF ′ definitionally
equivalent to S¬. Thus, for example, let J+ be positive intuitionistic logic.
Intuitionistic negation can be introduced in J+ by adding a falsity constant
F to the positive language together with the definition
(c). ¬A ↔ (A → F )
and by adding to J+ the axiom
(d). F → A
Alternatively, negation can be introduced by adding to the positive
language a (negation) connective and supplementing J+ with the following
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axioms
(e). (A → ¬B)→ (B → ¬A)
(f). ¬A → (A → B)
Once F is defined in the latter language, it is not difficult to prove that
the two alternatives are definitionally equivalent. So far, so good. But
if either the positive language or the negation introduced is weaker, the
task of finding definitionally equivalent logics (with the constant and the
connective) is, if not impossible, a harder one. Thus, for example, which
extension, if any, of BK+ with a negation connective (and without F ) is
equivalent to the logic BKm mentioned above?
Although BK+ is not a particularly strong logic, we shall show how
to build up logics definitionally equivalent to BKcdn, BKcdnr and BKj by
introducing negation as a primitive unary connective.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2, the logic BKcdn,¬ defini-
tionally equivalent to BKcdn is introduced. In §3, 4, semantics for BKcdn,¬
is provided, and soundness and completeness are proved. In §5, the logic
BKcdnr,¬ definitionally equivalent to BKcdnr is defined and semantics for it
together with soundness and completeness are given. In §6, the logic BKj,¬
definitionally equivalent to BKj is introduced together with a semantics
and sketches of soundness and completeness based on [6]. Finally, in §7,
the definitional equivalence is proved.
.2 BK+ with weak contraposition and weak double negation.
The logic BKcdn,¬
As pointed out above, BK+ is the result of adding the rule
K: ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ B → A
to Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+. On the other hand, BK+
models are defined, similarly, as B+ models except that the set O of des-
ignated points is deleted and consequently, validity is defined in respect of
all points in K (cf. [6], [7]). Next, the logic BKcdn,¬ is defined.
The unary connective ¬ (negation) is added to the positive language.
Then, the logic BKcdn,¬ can be axiomatized by adding to BK+ the following
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axioms
A1. ¬B → [(A → B)→ ¬A]
A2. (A → ¬B)→ (B → ¬A)
The logic BKcdn,¬ can intuitively be described as the logic BK+ plus the
weak constructive contraposition and double negation axioms. We note the
following theorems and rules of inference of BKcdn,¬ (a proof for each one
of them is sketched to their right):
T1. ⊢ A → ¬B ⇒ ⊢ B → ¬A A2
T2. A → ¬¬A T1
T3. (A → B)→ (¬B → ¬A) A2, T2
T4. B → [(A → ¬B)→ ¬A] A1, T2
T5. A → [(A → ¬B)→ ¬B] A2, T4
T6. ¬A → [A → ¬(A → A)] A1, A2
T7. [B → ¬(A → A)]→ ¬B T4
T8. ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ ¬A → ¬B K, T3
T9. ¬A → (A → ¬B) T6, T8
T10. (¬A ∨ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B) T3
T11. (¬A ∧ ¬B)↔ ¬(A ∨B) T1, T3
Note that A2 and T3 are the weak contraposition axioms; A1 and T4,
the weak “permuted” contraposition axioms, and T2, introduction of dou-
ble negation. In addition, the following theorems are useful in establishing
the definitional equivalence between BKcdn and BKcdn,¬: given T7 and T9,
it is proved
T12. ¬A ↔ [A → ¬(B → B)] T7, T9
and by using T12,
T13. (A → B)→ {[B → ¬ (A → A)]→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]} T3, T12
T14. [B → ¬ (A → A)]→ {(A → B)→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]} A1, T12
T15. A → {[A → ¬ (A → A)]→ ¬(A → A)} T5
T16. {A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]} → {B → [A → ¬ (A → A)]} A2, T12
T17. B → {[A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]} T4, T12
Next, we note the following
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Proposition 2.1. BKcdn,¬ is well axiomatized in respect of BK+. That
is, given BK+, A1 and A2 are mutually independent.
Proof. By MaGIC, the matrix generator developed by J. Slaney (see
[8]). 
Alternative axiomatizations of BKcdn,¬ with A1 and A2 and T1-T4 can
be proposed (cf. [6]). We end this section with the following remark:
Remark 2.2. The logic BKcdn,¬ is deductively equivalent to the logic
BKc2 defined in [5].
.3 Semantics for BKcdn,¬
A BKcdn,¬ model is a quadruple 〈K, S, R, 〉 where S is a non-empty
subset of K, and K, R and  are defined, in a similar way, as in BK+
models except for the addition of the following clause and postulates:
(i). a  ¬A iff for all b, c ∈ K, (Rabc & c ∈ S)⇒ b 2 A
P1. (R2abcd & d ∈ S)⇒ (∃x ∈ K)(∃y ∈ S)(Rbcx & Raxy)
P2. (R2abcd & d ∈ S)⇒ (∃x ∈ K)(∃y ∈ S)(Racx & Rbxy)
A is BKcdn,¬ valid (BKcdn,¬ A) iff a  A for all a ∈ K in all models.
The intuitive meaning of clause (i) is briefly discussed in the following
section, Remark 4.7.
Before proving soundness, we note two useful (and meaningful) lemmas:
Lemma 3.1. (a ≤ b & a  A)⇒ b  A
Proof. As in the case of BK+ (or B+), induction on the length of A. 
Lemma 3.2.  A → B iff for all a ∈ K in all BKcdn,¬ models, a 
A ⇒ a  B.
Proof. Similarly, as in the case of BK+ (or B+). 
Now, we prove
Theorem 3.3 (soundness of BKcdn,¬). If ⊢BKcdn,¬ A, then BKcdn,¬ A.
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Proof. Given the soundness of BK+ (cf. [6]), it remains to prove that
A1 and A2 are valid.
A1 is BKcdn,¬ valid : Suppose, for reductio, that A1 is not BKcdn,¬ valid.
By Lemma 3.2, a  ¬B, a 2 (A → B) → ¬A for wff A, B and a ∈ K in
some model. Then, b  A → B, c 2 ¬A for b, c ∈ K such that Rabc. By
clause (i), d  A for d ∈ K, e ∈ S such that Rcde. Then, R2abde whence,
by P1, Rbdz and Razu for z ∈ K, u ∈ S. So, z  B. On the other hand,
by a  ¬B and clause (i), (Raxy & y ∈ S) ⇒ x 2 A for all x ∈ K and
y ∈ S. Consequently, z 2 A, a contradiction. The proof of the validity of
A2 is similar and is left to the reader. 
We end this section with the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. Let 〈K, S, R, 〉 be a BKcdn,¬ model. Let ¬A be a
theorem. Then, A is false in every a ∈ S.
Proof. Suppose ¬A is a theorem. Then, ¬A is valid by the soundness
theorem. Let a ∈ S. As for every a ∈ K, there is some x ∈ K such that
Rxaa, clearly x  ¬A, and so, a 2 A by clause (i). 
So, note that the argument of a negative formula that is a theorem is
false at each point of S in each model.
In the next section, the completeness of BKcdn,¬ in respect of the se-
mantics defined in this one is proved.
.4 Completeness of BKcdn,¬
We begin by defining the concept of a theory.
Definition 4.1. Let L be a language and S be a logic defined on L.
An S-theory is a set of formulas of L closed under adjunction and provable
entailment. That is a is an S-theory if whenever A, B ∈ A then A∧B ∈ a;
and if whenever A → B is a theorem of S and A ∈ a, then B ∈ a.
Next, we recall the two senses of weak consistency introduced in [5].
These notions will be used in the completeness proof.
Definition 4.2. Let a be an S-theory. Then, a is w1-inconsistent
(weakly inconsistent in a first sense) iff ¬A ∈ a, A being a theorem of
S (a is w1-consistent iff it is not w1-inconsistent).
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Definition 4.3. Let a be an S-theory. Then, a is w2-inconsistent
(weakly inconsistent in a second sense) iff A ∈ a, ¬A being a theorem
of S (a is w2-consistent iff it is not w2-inconsistent).
In other words, a theory is w1-inconsistent iff it contains the negation
of a theorem; and it is w2-inconsistent iff it contains the argument of a
negation formula that is a theorem.
Now, let B+,¬ be any negation extension of B+ in which the rule intro-
duction of double negation (dn)
dn. ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ ¬¬A
holds. It is proved:
Proposition 4.4. Let a be a B+,¬ theory. Then, if a is w1-inconsistent,
then a is w2-inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose ¬A ∈ a, A being a theorem. By dn, ¬¬A is also a
theorem, and thus, a contains the argument of a negation formula that is
a theorem. 
Next, let B+,¬ be any negation extension of B+ in which the principle
of introduction of double negation T2 holds. It is proved:
Proposition 4.5. Let a be a B+,¬ theory. Then, if a is w2-inconsistent,
then a is w1-inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ a, ¬A being a theorem. By T2, ¬¬A ∈ a, and
thus, a contains the negation of a theorem. 
As a corollary of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we have:
Proposition 4.6. Let a be a BKcdn,¬ theory. Then, a is w1-consistent
iff a is w2-consistent.
Therefore, in BKcdn,¬, w1-consistency and w2-consistency are equiva-
lent.
As we shall see, in this logic, consistency has to be understood in one of
these two senses. But we remark that w1-consistency and w2-consistency
are not, in general, equivalent. In particular, they are not equivalent in
theories whose underlying logic is a constructive entailment logic: in these
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logics, consistency has to be understood as w2-consistency (cf. the logic
BKm in [6] or the logics defined in [4]).
On the other hand, we note the following remark on the intuitive mean-
ing of clause (i):
Remark 4.7. Clause (i) is an adaptation of the negation clause char-
acteristic of minimal intuitionistic logic in binary relational semantics. The
intuitionistic clause reads:
a  ¬A iff (Rab & b ∈ S)⇒ b 2 A
That is, a formula of the form ¬A is true at point a iff A is false in all
consistent points accessible from a. “Consistent” is here understood in
the minimal intuitionistic way. So, in the ternary relational semantics, the
(minimal) intuitionistic clause would be translated as clause (i). That is, a
formula of the form ¬A is true at point a iff A is false at all points b such
that Rabc for all consistent points c. “Consistent” is here understood as
w-consistent in either of the two senses of this concept.
Before introducing the canonical model, some definitions are needed. A
theory is null iff it does not contain any wff; it is regular iff it contains all
theorems. Finally, a theory a is prime iff whenever A ∨B ∈ a, then A ∈ a
or B ∈ a. Now, let KT be the set of all BKcdn,¬ theories. The relation R
T is
defined as follows: for all a, b, c ∈ KT , and wff A, B, RT abc iff if A → B ∈ a
and A ∈ b, then B ∈ c. Next, let KC be the set of all prime non-null BKcdn,¬
theories, SC be the set of all prime w2-consistent non-null BKcdn,¬ theories,
and RC be the restriction of RT to KC . Finally, C A iff A ∈ a. Then, the
BKcdn,¬ canonical model is the quadruple
〈
KC , SC , RC , C
〉
. We note the
following:
Remark 4.8. Given Proposition 4.6, SC could, of course, have been
defined as the set of all prime w1-consistent theories.
Next, we record a couple of lemmas on non-null theories, and a series
of lemmas which are an easy restriction of the corresponding B+ lemmas
to the case of non-null theories (cf. [6]). By the K rule, it is proved:
Lemma 4.9. Let a ∈ KT . Then, a is regular iff a is non-null.
By Lemma 4.9, we have:
MINIMAL NON-RELEVANT LOGICS WITHOUT THE K AXIOM 105
Lemma 4.10. Let a, b be non-null theories. The set x = {B | ∃A[A →
B ∈ a & A ∈ b]} is a non-null theory such that RT abx.
Then, we have,
Lemma 4.11. Let A be a wff, a a non-null element in KT and A /∈ a.
Then, A /∈ x for some x ∈ KC such that a ⊆ x.
Lemma 4.12. Let a be a non-null element in KT , b ∈ KT and c a
prime member in KC such that RT abc. Then, RT xbc for some x ∈ KC
such that a ⊆ x.
Lemma 4.13. Let a ∈ KT , b a non-null element in KT and c a prime
member in KC such that RT abc. Then, RT axc for some x ∈ KC such that
b ⊆ x.
Lemma 4.14. a ≤C b iff a ⊆ b.
An important corollary of Lemma 4.11 is:
Lemma 4.15. If 0BKcdb,¬ A, then there is some x ∈ K
C such that
A /∈ x.
Now, we prove that BKcdn,¬ is w2-consistent and the primeness lemma.
Proposition 4.16. The logic BKcdn,¬ is w2-consistent.
Proof. Let ¬A be a theorem. By Proposition 3.4, A is not BKcdn,¬
valid. So, A is not derivable in BKcdn,¬ by the soundness theorem. Con-
sequently, BKcdn,¬ is w2-consistent (so, it is, of course, w1-consistent by
Proposition 4.5). 
Next, we prove the primeness lemma.
Lemma 4.17 (Primeness lemma). If a is a w2-consistent BKcdn,¬ the-
ory, then there is a prime w2-consistent BKcdn,¬ theory x (i.e., a member
of SC) such that a ⊆ x.
This lemma is immediate from Proposition 4.6 and Proposition 4.18
that follows.
Let B+,¬ be any negation extension of B+ in which the De Morgan law
dm1. (¬A ∨ ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B)
holds. It is proved:
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Proposition 4.18. Let a be a w1-consistent B+,¬ theory. Then, there
is some prime w1-consistent B+,¬ theory x such that a ⊆ x.
Proof. Define from a a maximal w1-consistent theory x such that
a ⊆ x. If x is not prime, then there are wff A, B such that A∨B ∈ x, A /∈ x,
B /∈ x. Define the set [x,A] = {C | ∃D[D ∈ x & ⊢B+,¬ (A ∧ D) → C]}.
Define [x,B] similarly. It is not difficult to prove that [x,A] and [x,B]
are theories strictly including x. By the maximality of x, they are w1-
inconsistent. That is, ¬C ∈ [x,A], ¬D ∈ [x,B] for some theorems C, D.
By definitions, we have ⊢B+,¬ (A∧E)→ ¬C, ⊢B+,¬ (B∧E
′)→ ¬C for some
E, E′ ∈ x. By basic theorems of B+, ⊢ [(A∨B)∧(E∧E
′)]→ (¬C∨¬D). So,
¬C∨¬D ∈ x, and by dm1, ¬(C∧D) ∈ x. But, by adjunction, ⊢B+,¬ C∧D.
Therefore, if x is not prime, it is w1-inconsistent, which is impossible. 
Consequently, in any logic including B+ plus dm1, w1-consistent theo-
ries can be extended to prime w1-consistent theories.
Finally, we prove a lemma that will be useful for proving the canonical
adequacy of postulate P1.
Lemma 4.19. Let a, b, c be non-null elements in KT , and d be a w2-
consistent element in KT such that RT2abcd. Then, there are x ∈ KT and
w2-consistent y in KT such that RT bcx and RT axy.
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the lemma. Then, RT abz and RT zcd
for some z ∈ KT . Define the non-null theories x = {B | ∃A[A → B ∈
b & A ∈ c]}, y = {B | ∃A[A → B ∈ a & A ∈ x]} such that RT bcx and
RT axy (cf. Lemma 4.10). We prove that y is w2-consistent. Suppose it is
not. Then, A ∈ y, ¬A being a theorem. So, B → A ∈ a, C → B ∈ b for
some wff B and C ∈ c. By A1, (B → A)→ ¬B is a theorem. So, ¬B ∈ a.
Again, by A1, (C → B)→ ¬C ∈ a. Therefore, ¬C ∈ z (RT abz).
Now, by T6, ¬C → [C → ¬(C → C)]. So, ¬(C → C) ∈ d (RT zcd),
contradicting the w2-consistency of d (note that ¬¬(C → C) is a theorem
by T2). 
Next, we prove the completeness theorem:
Theorem 4.20 (Completeness of BKcdn,¬). If BKcdn,¬ A, then
⊢BKcdn,¬ A.
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Proof. Given the completeness of BK+, we have to prove:
1. The set SC is not empty:
The logic BKcdn,¬ is w2-consistent by proposition 4.16. Then, by the
primeness lemma (Lemma 4.17), there is some x ∈ SC such that BKcdn,¬ ⊆
x.
2. Postulates P1, P2 hold in the BKcdn,¬ canonical model:
We prove that P1 holds. The proof for P2 is similar and is left to reader.
P1 reads canonically as follows: P1C . (RC2abcd & d ∈ SC) ⇒ (∃x ∈
KC)(∃y ∈ SC)(RCbcx & RCaxy). So, suppose RC2abcd, d ∈ SC . By
Lemma 4.19, there are z ∈ KT and w2-consistent u in KT such that RT bcz
and RT azu. By the primeness lemma (Lemma 4.17), there is some y ∈ SC
such that u ⊆ y. Clearly, RT azy. By Lemma 4.13, there is x ∈ KC such
that z ⊆ x and RCaxy. Clearly, RCbcx. Therefore, we have x ∈ KC ,
y ∈ SC such that RCbcx and RCaxy, as it was required.
3. C is a valuation relation satisfying condition (i):
Suppose a  ¬A, RCabc, c ∈ SC , and for reductio, A ∈ b. Then, by T6,
¬(A → A) ∈ c, contradicting the w2-consistency of c.
Now, suppose a 2 ¬A. Define the non-null theories z = {C |⊢BKcdn,¬
A → C}, u = {C | ∃D[D → C ∈ a & D ∈ z]} such that RT azu (cf.
Lemma 4.10). Clearly, A ∈ z. Suppose now that u is not w2-consistent.
i.e., B ∈ u, ¬B being a theorem. Then, for some wff C, C → B ∈ a and
⊢BKcdn,¬ A → C. So, A → B ∈ a. Then, by A1, ¬A ∈ a, contradicting the
hypothesis. Now, by the primeness lemma (Lemma 4.17) and Lemma 4.13,
u and z are extended to prime w2-consistent y and prime x, respectively,
such that RCaxy and A ∈ x (A ∈ z), as it was required. 
.5 BKcdn,¬ with the reductio axioms: the logic BKcdnr,¬
The logic BKcdnr,¬ can be axiomatized by adding to BKcdn,¬ the axiom:
A3. (A → B)→ [(A → ¬B)→ ¬A]
The logic BKcdn,¬ can intuitively be described as the logic BK+ plus the
weak contraposition, weak double negation and weak reductio axioms. In
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addition to T1-T17, we note the following theorems of BKcdnr,¬:
T18. (⊢ A → B & ⊢ A → ¬B)⇒ ⊢ ¬A A3
T19. ⊢ A → B ⇒ ⊢ (A → ¬B)→ ¬A A3
T20. (A → ¬B)→ [(A → B)→ ¬A] T2, A3
T21. ⊢ A → ¬B ⇒ ⊢ (A → B)→ ¬A T20
T22. (A → ¬A)→ ¬A T19
T23. ¬(A ∧ ¬A) T18
T24. A → ¬(A → ¬A) A2, T22
T25. (A → ¬B)→ ¬(A ∧B) T19
T26. (A → B)→ ¬(A ∧ ¬B) T21
T27. (A ∧B)→ ¬(A → ¬B) A2, T25
T28. (A ∧ ¬B)→ ¬(A → B) A2, T26
T29. (A ∧ ¬A)→ ¬B T9, T23
Note that A3 and T20 are the reductio axioms; T18, T19 and T21,
the reductio rules; T22 (or T24 in a contrapositional expression) is special
reductio; T23 is the principle of non-contradiction, and T29, a restricted
version of the ECQ (“E contradictione quodlibet”) axiom. Finally, T25-
T28 are part of the classical interdefinition between the conditional and the
conjunction.
As in the case of BKcdn,¬, the following theorems, which are derivable
by using T12, are useful in establishing definitional equivalence.
T30. [A ∧ [A → ¬ (A → A)]]→ ¬ (A → A) T29, T12
T31. (⊢ A → B & ⊢ A → [B → ¬ (A → A)])⇒ ⊢ A → ¬ (A → A)
T18, T12
T32. [A → [A → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [A → ¬ (A → A)] T22, T12
T33. A → {[A → [A → ¬ (A → A)]]→ ¬ (A → A)} T15, T32
T34. ⊢ A → B ⇒ ⊢ [A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]
T19, T12
T35. ⊢ [A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]⇒ ⊢ (A → B)→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]
T21, T12
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T36. [A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [(A ∧B)→ ¬ (A → A)] T25, T12
T37. (A → B)→ [[A ∧ [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ ¬ (A → A)] T26, T12
T38. (A ∧B)→ {[A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ ¬ (A → A)} T27, T12
T39. [[A ∧ [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [(A → B)→ ¬ (A → A)] T28, T12
T40. (A → B)→ {[A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]]→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]}
A3, T12
T41. {A → [B → ¬ (A → A)]} → {(A → B)→ [A → ¬ (A → A)]}
T20, T12
We end this general syntactical description of BKcdnr,¬ with the follow-
ing:
Proposition 5.1. (a) Axiom A1 is not independent (the proof is left to
the reader). So, A2 and A3 do axiomatize BKcdnr,¬, and given BK+, they
are mutually independent (proof by MaGIC). (b) Given BKcdn,¬, A3 can
be substituted by any one of T18-T29 (cf. [6]). (c) The logic BKcdnr,¬ is
deductively equivalent to the logic BKc5 defined in [3].
We now define the semantics for BKcdnr,¬.
A BKcdnr,¬ model is defined, similarly, as BKcdn,¬ models except for the
addition of the following postulate
P3. (R2abcd & d ∈ S)⇒ (∃x, y ∈ K)(∃z ∈ S)(Racx & Rbcy & Ryxz)
A is BKcdnr,¬ valid (BKcdnr,¬ A) iff a  A for all a ∈ K in all models.
Given the soundness of BKcdn,¬, it is clear that to prove the soundness
of BKcdnr,¬, we just have to prove that A3 is BKcdnr,¬ valid.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness of BKcdnr,¬). If ⊢BKcdnr,¬ A, then BKcdnr,¬ A.
A3 is BKcdnr,¬ valid :
Proof. Suppose, for reductio, a  A → B, a 2 (A → ¬B) → ¬A for
wff A, B and a ∈ K in some model. Then, b  A → ¬B, c 2 ¬A for b,
c ∈ K such that Rabc; by clause (i), d  A for d ∈ K, e ∈ S such that
Rcde. By P3, Radz, Rbdu, Ruzw for u, z ∈ K and w ∈ S. So, z  B
(Radz) and u  ¬B (Rbdu). Now, by clause (i), (Ruxy & y ∈ S)⇒ x 2 A
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for all x ∈ K and y ∈ S, and by Ruzw, w ∈ S and clause (i), z 2 B, a
contradiction. 
On the other hand, given the completeness of BKcdn,¬, it is obvious
that to prove completeness for BKcdnr,¬, we just have to prove that P3
holds canonically.
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness of BKcdnr,¬). If BKcdnr,¬ A, then
⊢BKcdnr,¬ A.
In order to prove that P3 holds canonically, let us first introduce the
following definition (cf. Definitions 4.2, 4.3):
Definition 5.4. Let a be an S-theory. Then, a is n-inconsistent (nega-
tion inconsistent) iff for some wffA, A∧¬A ∈ a (a is n-consistent —negation
consistent— iff a is not n-inconsistent).
Notice that Definitions 4.2, 4.3 and 5.4 all involve negation. They
can be viewed as different ramifications of the notion of (in)consistency
with respect to negation in classical logic. Definition 6.2 below introduces
yet another concept of (in)consistency, which is an adaptation of absolute
(in)consistency to theories of non-classical systems (cf. e.g. [2], §17). We
have the three propositions that follow:
Proposition 5.5. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of BK+, and
let a be any BK+,¬ theory. Then, (a) if a is w1-inconsistent, then a is
n-inconsistent, and (b) if a is w2-inconsistent, then a is n-inconsistent.
Proof. (a) Let ¬A ∈ a, A being a theorem. By the K rule, ¬A → A is
also a theorem. So, A ∈ a, and consequently, A∧¬A ∈ a. (b) The proof is
similar to case (a). 
Proposition 5.6. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of BK+ in which
the rule
r. ⊢ B ⇒ ⊢ (A ∧ ¬A)→ ¬B
holds, and let a be any BK+,¬ theory. Then, a is n-consistent iff a is w1-
consistent.
Proof. By proposition 5.5 and the rule r. 
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Proposition 5.7. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of BK+ in which
the principle of non-contradiction T23 holds, and let a be any BK+,¬ theory.
Then, a is n-consistent iff a is w2-consistent.
Proof. By Proposition 5.5 and T23. 
A corollary of Propositions 5.6 and 5.7 is:
Proposition 5.8. Let a be a BKcdnr,¬ theory. Then, a is n-consistent
iff a is w1-consistent iff a is w2-consistent.
Finally, and, similarly, as in the case of w1-consistency (cf. Proposition
4.18), a proposition on the extension of n-consistent theories to prime n-
consistent theories is provable. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of
BK+ in which T11 and T23 hold. We leave to the reader the proof of the
following proposition (cf. Proposition 4.18).
Proposition 5.9. Let a be an n-consistent BK+,¬ theory. Then, there
is some prime n-consistent BK+,¬ theory x such that a ⊆ x.
Therefore, note that given Proposition 5.8, consistency in BKcdnr,¬ can
be understood (at our convenience) either as n-consistency or else in any
one of the two senses of w-consistency.
Next, we prove a lemma from which the canonical validity of P3 follows
immediately.
The BKcdnr,¬ canonical model is defined, similarly, as the BKcdn,¬ canon-
ical model, its items being now referred, of course, to BKcdnr,¬ theories (note
that SC is the set of all prime consistent theories, where consistency can
equivalently be understood in any one of the three senses discussed so far).
Then, it is proved:
Lemma 5.10. Let a, b, c be non-null elements in KT and d be an n-
consistent element in KT such that RT2abcd. Then, there are x, y ∈ KT
and n-consistent z in KT such that RT acx, RT bcy and RTyxz.
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the lemma. Then, Rabu and Rucd
for some u ∈ KT . Define the non-null theories x = {B | ∃A[A → B ∈ a &
A ∈ c]}, y = {B | ∃A[A → B ∈ b & A ∈ c]}, z = {B | ∃A[A → B ∈
y & A ∈ x]} such that RTacx, RT bcy and RT yxz. Suppose that z is n-
inconsistent. Then, ¬A ∈ z for some theorem A. Then, C → (B → ¬A) ∈
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b, D → B ∈ a for some wff B and C, D ∈ c. By T4, (B → ¬A) → ¬B is
a theorem. So, [C → (B → ¬A)] → (C → ¬B) is also a theorem. Now,
C → ¬B ∈ b and by Rabu, C → ¬B ∈ u. Then, ¬B ∈ d (Rucd, C ∈ c).
On the other hand, as D → D ∈ u (cf. Lemma 4.9), D ∈ d (Rucd, D ∈ c).
Therefore, D ∧¬B ∈ d. Next, we prove that ¬(D ∧¬B) ∈ d, contradicting
the n-consistency of d. As D → B ∈ a, ¬(D ∧ ¬B) ∈ a by T26. Now,
let E ∈ b. By T9, (D ∧ ¬B) → ¬E ∈ a, whence E → ¬(D ∧ ¬B) ∈ a
by A2. Then, ¬(D ∧ ¬B) ∈ u (Rabu). By a similar argument and Rucd,
¬(D ∧ ¬B) ∈ d. 
Finally, we remark that the canonical validity of P3 follows from Lemma
5.10 in a similar way to which P1 follows from Lemma 4.19.
.6 BK+ with intuitionistic negation: the logic BKj,¬
The logic BKj,¬ can be axiomatized by adding to BKcdnr,¬ the axiom
A4. ¬A → (A → B)
We note that, in addition to T1-T41, the following are provable in BKj,¬:
T42. A → (¬A → B) A4, T2
T43. (A ∧ ¬A)→ B A4, T23
T44. ¬(A → A)→ B T42
The logic BKj,¬ can intuitively be described as the logic BK+ plus in-
tuitionistic negation: that is, BK+ plus the weak contraposition, double
negation, reductio, ECQ (“E contradictione quodlibet”) and EFQ (“E falso
quodlibet”) axioms (the ECQ axiom is T43; the EFQ axioms are A4 and
T42).
Next, we define the semantics.
A BKj,¬ model is a triple 〈K, R, 〉 where K, R and  are defined,
similarly, as in a BK+ model except that the following postulates and clause
are added:
P4. R2abcd ⇒ (∃x, y ∈ K)(Rbcx & Raxy)
P5. R2abcd ⇒ (∃x, y ∈ K)(Racx & Rbxy)
P6. R2abcd ⇒ (∃x, y, z ∈ K)(Racx & Rbcy & Ryxz)
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(i′). a  ¬A iff for all b, c ∈ K, Rabc ⇒ b 2 A
A is BKj,¬ valid (BKj,¬ A) iff a  A for all a ∈ K in all models.
It is clear that a BKj,¬ model is like a BKcdn,¬ model save for the omission
of all references to the set S: now S = K. Therefore, the soundness of BKj,¬
can be proved, similarly, as that of BKcdnr,¬ save for this difference: given
that in BKj,¬ models S = K, now A4 is valid.
A4 is BKj,¬ valid:
Proof. Suppose a  ¬A, a 2 A → B for a ∈ K in some model. Then,
b  A, c 2 B for b, c ∈ K such that Rabc. By clause (i’), b 2 A, a
contradiction (note that in BKcdnr,¬, if c /∈ S, A4 is not BKcdnr,¬ valid). 
Thus, we can state the soundness of BKj,¬.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness of BKj,¬). If ⊢BKj,¬ A, then BKj,¬ A.
Next, we proceed into proving completeness. We set the following defi-
nition (cf. Definitions 4.2, 4.3, 5.4):
Definition 6.2. Let a be an S-theory. Then, a is a-inconsistent (abso-
lutely inconsistent) iff a contains every wff (a is a-consistent —consistent
in an absolute sense— iff it is not a-inconsistent).
It is proved:
Proposition 6.3. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of BK+ in which
A4 holds, and let a be any BK+,¬ theory. Then, a is a-inconsistent iff a is
w1-inconsistent.
Proof. (a) If a is a-inconsistent, then a is obviously w1-inconsistent.
(b) Suppose a is w1-inconsistent. Then, ¬A ∈ a, A being a theorem. By
the K rule, ¬A → A is a theorem. So, A ∈ a, whence A ∧ ¬A ∈ a. Then,
by T43, for arbitrary wff B, B ∈ a. 
And from this proposition and Proposition 5.8, we have:
Proposition 6.4. Let a be a BKj,¬ theory. Then, a is a-inconsistent
iff a is n-inconsistent iff a is w1-inconsistent iff a is w2-inconsistent.
Next, we have the following proposition on the extension of a-consistent
theories to prime a-consistent theories (the proof is left to the reader).
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Proposition 6.5. Let BK+,¬ be any negation extension of BK+ in which
T43 holds, and let a be an a-consistent BK+,¬ theory. Then, there is some
prime a-consistent BK+,¬ theory x such that a ⊆ x.
Therefore, note that given Proposition 6.4, consistency in BKj,¬ can be
understood (at our convenience) either as a-consistency, or as n-consistency
or even as any one of the two senses of w-consistency.
But let us return to the completeness proof.
The BKj,¬ canonical model is the triple 〈K
C , RC , C〉 where RC and

C are defined as in the BKcdnr,¬ canonical model, but K
C is now the set of
all prime consistent non-null BKj,¬ theories, consistency being understood
in any of the senses in Proposition 6.4. Now, it is clear that in order to
prove the completeness of BKj,¬, most of the lemmas proved so far must be
modified. We have to prove that all theories defined in these lemmas are
consistent. As shown in [6], it can easily be done with the aid of Proposition
6.4. The reader is referred to [6] for details. We end this section by stating
the completeness of BKj,¬:
Theorem 6.6 (Completeness of BKj,¬). If BKj,¬ A, then ⊢BKj,¬ A.
.7 The definitional equivalence between BKcdn and BKcdn,¬
and their respective extensions
Firstly, we recall the logics BKcdn, BKcdnr and BKj defined in [6]. We add
the propositional falsity constant F to the positive language. Consider then
the following axioms and rule of inference.
a1. (A → B)→ [(B → F )→ (A → F )]
a2. (B → F )→ [(A → B)→ (B → F )]
a3. A → [(A → F )→ F ]
a4. [A → (B → F )]→ [B → (A → F )]
a5. B → [[A → (B → F )]→ (A → F )]
a6. ⊢ [A → (B → F )]⇒ ⊢ [B → (A → F )]
The logic BKcdn is equivalently axiomatized by adding to BK+ any of
the six following group of axioms:
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a: a2, a4
b: a4, a5
c: a1, a2, a3
d: a1, a2, a6
e: a1, a3, a5
f: a1, a5, a6
Consider now the following axioms and rules of inference:
a7. [A ∧ (A → F )]→ F
a8. (⊢ A → B & ⊢ A → (B → F ))⇒ ⊢ A → F
a9. [A → (A → F )]→ (A → F )
a10. A → [[A → (A → F )]→ F ]
a11. ⊢ A → B ⇒ ⊢ [[A → (B → F )]→ (A → F )]
a12. ⊢ A → (B → F )⇒ ⊢ (A → B)→ (A → F )
a13. [A → (B → F )]→ [(A ∧B)→ F ]
a14. (A → B)→ [[A ∧ (B → F )]→ F ]
a15. (A ∧B)→ [[A → (B → F )]→ F ]
a16. [(A ∧B)→ F )]→ [(A → B)→ F ]
a17. [A → (B → F )]→ [(A → B)→ (A → F )]
a18. (A → B)→ [[A → (B → F )]→ (A → F )]
The logic BKcdnr is equivalently axiomatized by adding to BKcdn any
one of the axioms a8-a18.
Finally, BKj is the result of adding to BKcdnr the axiom
a19. F → A
Now, negation is introduced in these logics via the definition
D¬. ¬A ↔ (A → F )
and F is introduced in BKcdn,¬, BKcdnr,¬ and BKj,¬ with the definition
DF . F ↔ ¬(A → A)
That is, F replaces any wff of the form ¬(A → A). Note that for any
formulas A, B, ¬(A → A) and ¬(B → B) are equivalent by T8, and so,
the defining formula does not depend on the choice of A.
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We shall now discuss the notion of definitional equivalence summarily.
We shall understand this notion as “definitional equivalence via transla-
tions”, which can briefly be defined as follows. Let L1 and L2 be two logics
in different languages, t1 a set of terms absent in L2, and t2, a set of terms
absent in L1. Then, L1 and L2 are definitional equivalent iff there are
definitions of t1 in terms of L2 (Dt1) and definitions of t2 in terms of L1
(Dt2) such that L1 ∪ {Dt2} = L2 ∪ {Dt1} (x ∪ y is the deductive closure
of the union of x and y, and definitions are expressed as a set of suitable
biconditionals). It is important to note that it is not sufficient to prove L1
⊆ L2 ∪ {Dt1} and L2 ⊆ L1 ∪ {Dt2} . It additionally has to be shown
that Dt2 is provable in L2 ∪ {Dt1} and that Dt1 is provable in L1 ∪ {Dt2}
(cf. [1]). Then, we have:
Proposition 7.1. D¬ is provable in BKcdn,¬ ∪ {DF}
Proof. By T6 and DF , ¬A → (A → F ). By T7 and DF , (A → F )→
¬A. So, ¬A ↔ (A → F ). 
Note that an immediate corollary is:
Proposition 7.2. (a) D¬ is provable in BKcdnr,¬ ∪ {DF}. (b) D¬ is
provable in BKj,¬ ∪ {DF}
Next, it is proved:
Proposition 7.3. DF is provable in BKcdn ∪ {D¬}
Proof. (a) By the K rule, (A → A)→ (F → F ). So, F → [(A → A)→
F ] by a4, i.e., F → ¬(A → A) by D¬. (b) By a3, [(A → A) → F ] → F ,
i.e., ¬(A → A)→ F by D¬. Therefore, F ↔ ¬(A → A). 
Again, an immediate corollary is :
Proposition 7.4. (a) DF is provable in BKcdnr ∪ {D¬}. (b) DF is
provable in BKj ∪ {D¬}.
On the other hand, we prove:
Proposition 7.5. (a) BKcdn,¬ ⊆ BKcdn∪{D¬}. (b) BKcdn ⊆ BKcdn,¬∪
{DF}.
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Proof. (a) A1 and A2 are a2 and a4 by D¬. (b) a1-a5 are T13-17,
respectively (a6 is immediate by T16). 
Proposition 7.6. (a) BKcdnr,¬ ⊆ BKcdnr ∪ {D¬}.
(b) BKcdnr ⊆ BKcdnr,¬ ∪ {DF}.
Proof. (a) A3 is a18 by D¬. (b) a7-a18 are T30-T41, respectively.
Then, Proposition 7.6 follows from Proposition 7.5. 
Proposition 7.7. (a) BKj,¬ ⊆ BKj ∪ {D¬}. (b) BKj ⊆ BKj,¬ ∪ {DF}.
Proof. (a) By a19, (A → F ) → (A → B), i.e., A4 by D¬. (b) T44 is
a19 by DF . Then, Proposition 7.7 follows from Proposition 7.6. 
Therefore, given Propositions 7.1 and 7.3, BKcdn and BKcdn,¬ are def-
initionally equivalent by Proposition 7.5; given Propositions 7.2 and 7.4,
BKcdnr and BKcdnr,¬ are definitionally equivalent by Proposition 7.6, and
finally, given Propositions 7.2 and 7.4, BKj and BKj,¬ are definitionally
equivalent by Proposition 7.7.
We end this paper with two remarks:
1. In BKj,¬, F could have been introduced by the alternative definition
DF ′. F ↔ (A ∧ ¬A)
because for any wff A, B, A∧¬A and B ∧¬B are equivalent by T43.
2. As it was noted in the introduction, a series of extensions of BKcdn,
BKcdnr and BKj with some strong positive axioms are defined in [6].
Given that BKcdn,¬, BKcdnr,¬ and BKj,¬ are definitionally equivalent to
BKcdn, BKcdnr and BKj, respectively, definitionally equivalent exten-
sions of the former with the same positive axioms are easily defined.
The details are left to the reader.
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